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Controlling the Jury-Teaching Function 
Richard D. Friedman* 
When evidence with a scientific basis is offered, two fundamental 
questions arise.  First, should it be admitted?  Second, if so, how should it be 
assessed?  There are numerous participants who might play a role in deciding 
these questions—the jury (on the second question only), the parties (through 
counsel), expert witnesses on each side, the trial court, the forces controlling 
the judicial system (which include, but are not limited to, the appellate 
courts), and the scientific establishment.  In this Article, I will suggest that 
together, the last two—the forces controlling the judicial system and the 
scientific establishment—have a large role to play in determining how 
statistically based evidence shall be explained to, and may be used by, the 
jury.  For this purpose, the scientific establishment includes not only 
statistical experts but also legal academics with an expertise in problems of 
inference and proof; they should assist the judicial system in devising pattern 
instructions to help the jury avoid well-recognized pitfalls in handling 
statistical evidence in certain well-defined and recurrent circumstances.  
Trial courts should be required to give those instructions in the prescribed 
circumstances, and neither the parties (themselves or their counsel) nor their 
experts should be allowed to say anything at variance with those instructions. 
Our system with respect to scientifically based evidence is controlled 
to a large extent by the parties and their experts.  The parties decide what 
experts to call, and the experts testify to the conclusions that can be drawn 
from the evidence.  There are limitations, of course.  The court must 
determine that the expert is sufficiently qualified to testify to an opinion on 
the given subject matter, and that the subject matter itself is sufficiently 
reputable, under Daubert or Frye or whatever standard is applicable in the 
jurisdiction.  But these constraints give the parties a great deal of free rein, 
and once the evidence is admitted, the lawyers ordinarily have wide leeway 
in making arguments based on the evidence.  That is usually all for the good, 
and indeed I believe that trial judges should ordinarily play less of a role than 
they do in filtering scientific evidence for the jury.  In some cases, judges 
 
* Professor, University of Michigan Law School.  This Article is based on a presentation given 
at the 2017 Seton Hall Law Review Symposium honoring Michael Risinger, who has long 
been one of our most insightful, careful, erudite, and influential scholars of evidence law, 
especially scientific evidence.  It was an honor and a privilege to participate in the symposium.   
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should decide as a matter of law that a body of evidence is not sufficient for 
the case to reach the jury, but judges ought rarely, if ever, decide that a given 
piece of evidence should not be presented to the jury because the jurors are 
too likely to overvalue it.1 
But I think courts should have a far different attitude when there is a 
plain danger that jurors may treat evidence in an illogical manner.  This 
danger arises with great frequency when parties present evidence that two 
items have a common source.  The evidence tends to center on two 
probabilities—a high probability, often close to one, that if the items did in 
fact have a common source, they would bear some similarity that they in fact 
do; and a low probability, sometimes infinitesimally low, that if the items 
did not share a common source, they would not bear that similarity.  And the 
problem is often exacerbated, rather than ameliorated, by the statements of 
expert witnesses and of counsel at trial.  I will focus on the two fallacies 
identified and labeled by Bill Thompson and Edward Schumann three 
decades ago: the prosecutor’s fallacy and the defense attorney’s fallacy.2 
Suppose, to take an example now offered by Thompson, a blood stain 
from a crime scene and a reference blood sample taken from the accused 
have the same DNA profile and that matching profiles are estimated to occur 
in 1 person among 10 million people in the Caucasian-American population.  
And suppose further that it is certain that the crime was committed by a 
Caucasian-American.  Then the prosecutor’s fallacy consists of inferring 
from this evidence that the odds that the crime-scene stain came from 
someone other than the accused are only 1 in 10 million. 
That is just plain wrong.  The 1-in-10-million random match probability 
is just one of the ingredients we must know to assess the probability that the 
accused is the source of the crime-scene stain.  Another is the probability 
that the match would appear if in fact the accused was the source.  If we can 
safely assume in a case like this that this probability is very close to 1, then 
it does not pose a substantial problem.  So those are two components 
necessary to assess the probability, in light of the DNA match, that the 
accused is the source of the crime-scene stain.  But there is another crucial 
element that the DNA evidence does not help assess—the prior odds, that is, 
the odds based on all the evidence other than the DNA evidence that the 
accused was the source of the crime-scene stain.  If those odds are assessed 
as exactly even—1 to 1—then the posterior odds (that is, the odds taking into 
account the DNA evidence) that the accused was the source of the crime-
 
 1  Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1047 (2003).   
 2  William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence 
in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987).   
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scene stain would in fact be 10 million to 1.  But if the prior odds are 
significantly different, so too are the posterior odds.  Most significantly, if 
the prior odds are very small, as they should be deemed to be if there is not 
substantial other evidence linking the accused to the crime-scene stain, then 
the posterior odds may be small as well; if, for example, the prior odds are 1 
to 7.5 billion (the accused is just as likely as every other person on earth to 
be the source of the stain), the posterior odds would be just 1 to 750. 
The DNA evidence cannot help assess the prior odds.  The expert 
witness has no valid basis for making an assessment, and it would be 
improper for the expert to offer such an assessment, or for that matter, to 
offer an assessment of the overall odds that the accused is the source of the 
crime-scene stain.  That is the jury’s job. 
Now consider the defense attorney’s fallacy.  Suppose the defendant 
has a characteristic that the perpetrator of the crime is known to have, and 
that only a small, but not infinitesimal, percentage of the population shares 
that characteristic.  “So it appears that whoever committed this crime was 
one-handed,” defense counsel might argue.  “And my client is one-handed.  
But this means nothing.  So are thousands of other people in this country 
alone.”  It is true that if there were no other evidence in the case, one could 
not ascribe guilt to the accused based simply on his one-handedness; indeed, 
the odds of guilt would remain very low.  But no sensible prosecutor would 
bring a case if that were the only evidence against the accused.  Presumably 
there is some other evidence making it at least plausible, in the jury’s eyes, 
that the accused committed the crime, even without taking the one-
handedness into account, and the evidence of one-handedness should 
increase the jury’s assessment of the odds of guilt many times, perhaps on 
the order of 8,000 times or more.3 
And so we have a complexity.  First, the expert can inform the jury 
about the probability that the evidence would arise if the accused is, or is not, 
the source of the crime-scene stain, but those in themselves do not tell the 
jury what it really needs to assess, the probability given the evidence that the 
accused was the source of that stain—and of course, they in themselves do 
not tell the jury what it ultimately needs to assess—the probability that the 
accused in fact committed the crime.  Second, assessing those critical 
probabilities depends in very large part on all the other evidence in the case; 
it is the jury’s job to evaluate that evidence, and the expert can offer no help 
 
 3  There are approximately 41,000 people in the United States missing a hand or an arm.  
Statistics on Hand and Arm Loss, INDUS. SAFETY & HYGIENE NEWS (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://www.ishn.com/articles/97844-statistics-on-hand-and-arm-loss.  The population of the 
United States is over 327 million.  U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. and World Population Clock, 
https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).  So approximately 1 in 8,000 
people in the United States is missing a hand or an arm.   
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in doing so.  And third, the jury must make the connection between all the 
other evidence in the case and the data indicating the significance of the 
particular identification evidence—that is, the jury must determine how to 
reassess the probability of guilt in light of that data.  This reassessment is 
difficult for many people; jurors may do it badly,4 and lawyers and even 
expert witnesses—who likely do not have expertise in probabilistic 
analysis—may well mislead them rather than provide genuine assistance.5 
So what should we do?  Thompson flirts, as others have done,6 with the 
idea of using non-numeric verbal descriptions of the strength of the 
identification evidence.  I am skeptical of the value of such evidence for 
several reasons.  First, verbal descriptions by definition give up on the 
precision that numerical information conveys.7  If one says the evidence 
provides “strong” support for the proposition of identity, what is the jury to 
make of that—how strong is “strong”?  Second, and relatedly, verbal 
descriptions fail to convey the power that very large (or very small) numbers 
do.  If the evidence is that the accused and the perpetrator share a trait, and 
the probability that a randomly chosen person would share that trait is only 
1 in 100 trillion, I do not think that saying that the evidence provides 
“extremely strong” support for identity suffices.  Third, verbal scales are by 
nature non-continuous.  Where should the boundary be drawn between 
“strong” and “very strong”?  And if the different wording is meant to convey 
a substantial difference in effect, is it not unsettling that a very small 
difference in the numbers is sufficient to move the description from one 
category to another?  Finally, a verbal scale does not necessarily solve the 
problem that the jury may misuse the evidence, and especially that it might 
commit the prosecutor’s fallacy.  That is, if the jury is told that the evidence 
provides “extremely strong” support for identity, we have no guarantee that 
the jury will use that evidence to reassess in a proper manner the probability 
 
 4  Thompson provides some evidence that they tend to do it reasonably well with respect 
to some types of evidence. William C. Thompson, How Should Forensic Scientists Present 
Source Conclusions?, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 773 (2018).   
 5  E.g., David H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, Can Jurors Understand Probabilistic 
Evidence?, 154 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y, SERIES A, 75 (1991), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap
ers.cfm?abstract_id=1487747 (reviewing empirical studies and concluding that they indicate 
a tendency on the part of jurors to give too little value to statistical evidence when they are 
also presented with other evidence).   
 6  Thompson, supra note 4; EUROPEAN NETWORK OF FORENSIC SCI. INSTS., ENFSI 
GUIDELINE FOR EVALUATIVE REPORTING IN FORENSIC SCIENCE: STRENGTHENING THE 
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC RESULTS ACROSS EUROPE (STEOFRAE) 16–17 (2015), 
http://enfsi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/m1_guideline.pdf; Ian W. Evett, Bayesian 
Inference and Forensic Science: Problems and Perspectives, 36 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y, 
SERIES D 99, 103 (1987) (presenting, without endorsing, a table of such descriptions).   
 7  Of course, the numbers, while precise, may not be accurate, and if the expert is 
ascribing numbers without a good basis, it may be that the numbers should not be presented 
to the jury.  But this is a separate problem.   
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of identity; it may be that the jury will simply infer the conclusion that the 
probability of identity is extremely high. 
I think we need another approach.  Although ordinarily the presentation 
of evidence and the argumentation from it are in the hands of the parties and 
their witnesses, there are limits.  And I think we should recognize and 
implement this limitation: a party or a witness should not be allowed to 
suggest that the jury operate in a demonstrably illogical manner. 
The validity of this limitation may not be self-evident.  Consider by 
analogy the law with respect to judicial notice of adjudicative facts.  I will 
use as an exemplar of that law Federal Rule of Evidence 201.  That Rule sets 
a high standard for such notice—the factual proposition in question must not 
be “subject to reasonable dispute,” and either it “is generally known within 
the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or it “can be accurately and readily 
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”8  
Now, if that rigorous standard is met in a civil case, the Rule prescribes that 
“the court must instruct the jury to accept the noticed fact as conclusive.”9  
But in a criminal case, even given that the proposition is not subject to 
reasonable dispute, “the court must instruct the jury that it may or may not 
accept the noticed fact as conclusive.”10  So if a party in a criminal case can 
suggest that the jury act on the basis of a factual proposition that the court 
believes is demonstrably false, can a party suggest that the jury act in a 
demonstrably illogical manner? 
I do not believe so.  For one thing, I believe that the “may or may not 
accept” language of Rule 201 is overly cautious, a product of an arguably 
overly aggressive implementation of the sound proposition that only the jury 
can determine guilt of a criminal defendant,11 conjoined with a misplaced 
emphasis on symmetry.12  It may make sense that the jury should not be 
instructed that it must treat a given fact as established unfavorably to an 
accused; it does not follow that a jury should not be instructed that it must 
treat a fact as established favorably to an accused. 
 
 8  FED. R. EVID. 201(b).   
 9  FED. R. EVID. 201(f).   
 10  Id.   
 11  That the implementation may be overly aggressive is supported by D. Michael 
Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and “Legitimate Moral Force”—
Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 407 n.14 
(1998) (arguing that a binding instruction is preferable in the context of judicial notice and 
other “non-evidence driven mechanisms,” and “presents no real constitutional issue as long 
as the jury is clearly free to return a general verdict of not guilty”).   
 12  See, e.g., Robert Laurence, The Bothersome Need for Asymmetry in Any Federally 
Dictated Rule of Recognition for the Enforcement of Money Judgments Across Indian 
Reservation Boundaries, 27 CONN. L. REV. 979, 985 (1995) (offering an asymmetrical 
proposal, defending an “unrepentant” attitude about the asymmetry, and noting that “[t]he 
universe itself is asymmetrical”).   
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But in any event, the strictures that apply to judicial notice should not 
apply in this context.  The present question is not whether a given fact 
bearing on the litigation is true; it is rather a matter of fundamental logic.  A 
party or a witness should not be allowed to encourage the jury to violate basic 
principles of logic—and that is all the more true when the error would be in 
favor of the prosecutor. 
The better analogy is not to the treatment of adjudicative facts but to 
that of legislative facts—facts on which the determination of the law 
depends.  By its explicit terms, Rule 201 does not cover judicial notice of 
such facts.13  This is appropriate because the situation governing judicial 
notice of legislative facts is altogether different from that governing judicial 
notice of adjudicative facts.  When the content of the law depends on a 
legislative fact, ultimately that fact must be determined (so far as the judicial 
system is concerned) by the court of last resort in the jurisdiction; otherwise 
the law might differ from court to court or even from case to case.14  That 
court is therefore not constrained by the record or arguments made by the 
parties or by the findings made by the trial court.  To take notice of a 
legislative fact, a court need not attain the level of certainty necessary for 
judicial notice of an adjudicative fact; given that the court needs to determine 
the law, it may have to determine (or at least act as if it has determined) a 
legislative fact one way or the other in the face of substantial uncertainty.  
And even given that uncertainty, the court operates as if the fact that it 
notices is absolutely true: it does not instruct the jury as to the fact, because 
there is no need to, but rather determines the law on the basis of the fact, and 
proceeds from there. 
With respect to principles of logic, there is not the same peremptory 
demand as to system-wide consistency as exists with respect to legislative 
facts.  But such principles transcend a single case—they frequently become 
critical in litigation—and there is no good reason not to apply them correctly 
and consistently.  Perhaps even more clearly, there is no good reason to allow 
the jury to be misinformed about them.  Experience has shown that expert 
witnesses and lawyers cannot be relied on to provide good advice to jurors 
in this respect, or even to avoid misinforming them; nor is there any reason 
to have confidence in trial judges—or for that matter, individual appellate 
judges—in this respect.  This is a matter that should be implemented system-
wide, with the participation of the scientific establishment, and for this 
purpose, I count legal academics with expertise in matters of inference and 
proof as part of the scientific establishment. 
 
 
 13  FED. R. EVID. 201(a).   
 14  The parenthetical qualification is in recognition that the law might be altered from 
outside the judicial system, such as by legislative or constitutional amendment. 
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In other words, what are needed are pattern jury instructions for 
frequently recurring situations, expressing logical principles for assessing 
evidence that includes numerified frequency rates or probability 
assessments.  I am not suggesting that courts introduce numbers where they 
are not already present.  Rather, I am saying that in recurrent situations in 
which the evidence presented by the parties includes numerified frequency 
rates or probability assessments, the trial court should be directed to give a 
prescribed instruction that attempts to inform the jury how to combine that 
evidence with the other evidence in the case, or at least attempts to inform 
the jurors how to avoid making easily recognizable mistakes.  I am 
suggesting more than perfunctory instructions, but rather attempts at 
teaching the jury.  I doubt that attempts to teach the jury how to operate 
Bayes’ Theorem formally are likely to succeed.15  I think the most we can 
hope for is probably to give jurors examples of how to deal with the numbers 
and to warn them of mistakes that they should avoid.16 
This is not a simple undertaking.  Careful thought must go into what 
kinds of jury instructions should be given in prescribed categories of 
situations.  As a teaser, I will present below a draft of what such an 
instruction might look like, for a situation like one of Thompson’s 
hypotheticals, in which the evidence suggests that the accused has a rare trait 
that the perpetrator did, but one common enough that there are probably 
numerous other people in the world who share it. 
 
Members of the jury, the prosecution has presented evidence 
concerning the DNA profile of the blood in the stain found at the 
crime scene.  According to the prosecution’s expert, this profile 
indicates that the blood could not be the victim’s.  Furthermore, 
according to the prosecution’s expert, she has compared the 
profile of the DNA found in that blood to the DNA profile of the 
accused, which according to prosecution evidence is known from 
a sample taken directly from the accused.  And the expert has 
testified that the profile taken from the crime-scene stain is just 
what one would expect if the accused was the source of the stain.  
Furthermore, according to the prosecution’s expert, if a randomly 
chosen member of the Caucasian population of the United States 
 
 15  Cf. Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, The Continuing Debate Over 
Mathematics in the Law of Evidence: A Comment on “Trial by Mathematics,” 84 HARV. L. 
REV. 1801 (1971); Michael Finkelstein & William Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to 
Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970).   
 16  My focus here is on the situation in which the expert offers numerified evidence.  But 
if the expert does not do so, I believe the same approach would be useful.  If, for example, the 
expert testified that the evidence provides “extremely strong support” for the proposition of 
common source, the court should explain both that this does not mean that the proposition is 
extremely probable and why it does not mean that.   
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were the source of the stain, there would only be one chance in 10 
million that this profile would appear in the DNA. 
 
Now, you have to determine whether you believe all this evidence.  
Were the samples taken as the prosecution evidence indicates?  
Were the tests performed separately and properly on the crime-
scene stain and on the sample taken from the accused?  (If by 
mistake or otherwise, one sample was tested twice, evidence that 
the same profile appeared both times would be meaningless.)  
Were the profiles as described?  Do the two profiles have the 
similarities that the prosecution’s expert contends?  Is the profile 
found on the crime-scene stain as rare as the prosecution 
contends? 
 
But even if you accept all the prosecution evidence concerning 
DNA, you then must consider what significance to attach to it.  
You must put the DNA evidence together with all the other 
evidence in the case to determine whether, on the basis of all the 
evidence, the prosecution has proven the accused’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  It is crucial to bear in mind that even if you 
believe that the DNA profiles bore rare similarities, and that only 
one person in 10 million among the Caucasian population of the 
United States has such a profile, and even if you are convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the perpetrator was a Caucasian 
member of the United States population, that does not mean that 
there is only one chance in 10 million that someone other than the 
accused was the source of the crime-scene stain.  These are two 
very different matters.  The DNA evidence, if you believe it, 
indicates that the accused has a DNA profile that is present in the 
crime-scene stain and that is very rare.  But even if the profile is 
very rare, that does not in itself tell you what you need to 
determine—how probable is it that the accused left the crime-
scene stain, which is a factor that may be important in determining 
how probable it is that the accused committed the crime. 
 
I will try to clarify the point by giving you a couple of examples.  
Suppose that a person was charged with a burglary and the only 
evidence against him was that he has red hair, the robber was red-
headed, and no more than 6% of the American population is red-
headed.  Obviously, the probability that someone other than the 
accused committed the crime is not 6%; rather, given only that 
evidence, it is virtually certain that someone other than the 
accused committed the crime, because there are millions of people 
in this country alone who are red-headed and there is no evidence 
suggesting that the accused was more likely than any of them to 
have committed the crime. 
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Now, in case that example seems to be fanciful, let me tell you 
about an actual incident that happened some years ago in England, 
in which a man was accused of committing a theft on the basis of 
a DNA test.  According to that test, his DNA contained a 
combination of features that is in the DNA of only one person out 
of 37 million but that was in the DNA of a stain found at the scene, 
presumably left by the perpetrator.  But that was the only 
substantial evidence against the accused, and other factors made 
it improbable that he had committed the crime—he lived 200 
miles away, and he was severely disabled.17  One in 37 million 
means that this combination of features is very rare; if we chose a 
single person at random we could say that the chance was only 
one in 37 million that that person would have DNA with that 
combination.  But there are 7.5 billion people in the world, and so 
there are probably about 200 people with that combination.  Now, 
if we did not know about the DNA evidence against this one 
person, we would have to say that the chance that he committed 
the crime was infinitesimal; he was, after all, only one person with 
no particular evidence pointing towards him and a couple of 
factors, his disability and his distance from the crime, making it 
highly unlikely that he was the perpetrator.  And even after 
receiving the DNA evidence, even though we would say that this 
increased the chance that he was the perpetrator, we would have 
to say that the chance remained tiny; it was far more likely that 
one of the other people in the world with that combination of DNA 
features committed the crime. 
 
Now, don’t make the opposite mistake and assume that just 
because other people in the world might have the characteristic in 
question, it is no more likely that the accused committed the crime 
than that any of them did.  Let’s consider our red-headed suspect 
again.  Let’s say that there is substantial evidence against him—
he lives near the place of the burglary, and the day after the 
burglary he attempted to sell a rare object of art that disappeared 
in the burglary.  Now, if we add in the fact that he is red-headed 
and testimony that the thief, whoever it might be, was red-headed, 
clearly one would not say he is no more likely than any other 
redhead to be the thief.  However likely it may have appeared, on 
the basis of the other evidence in the case, that the accused was 
the thief, the evidence that he and the perpetrator both have red 
 
 17  Guilty By a Handshake? Crime-Scene DNA Tests May Not Be as Accurate as We Are 
Led to Believe, HERALD (Scot. May 1, 2006), http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/1244088
9.Guilty_by_a_handshake_Crime_scene_DNA_tests_may_not_be_as_accurate_as_we_are_
led_to_believe/.  
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hair makes that proposition appear substantially more likely. 
 
And the significance of that evidence depends on how rare red-
headedness is; if, instead of the accused and the thief sharing red-
headedness, they shared right-handedness, we would not say that 
evidence is very significant at all, because most people are right-
handed.  At the other extreme, if the shared characteristic is very 
rare, then, its significance may be very great when it is put 
together with other evidence.  So let’s suppose in the English 
example that rather than living 200 miles from the scene of the 
theft the accused lived just down the street, that the evening before 
the theft he was seen walking back and forth past the house where 
the theft occurred, and that he was able-bodied rather than 
severely disabled.  Of course, that evidence on its own still leaves 
it as improbable that the accused was the perpetrator; there may 
be hundreds of able-bodied people who live about as close or 
closer, the crime may well have been committed by one of the 
much larger population that lives further away, and there may be 
perfectly innocent explanations for why he was walking past the 
scene of the crime later committed.  But now if we add in that the 
accused has a DNA profile that the perpetrator did, and that only 
one in 37 million people have that profile, a jury could well 
conclude that beyond a reasonable doubt the accused committed 
the crime; true, there may be hundreds of people around the world 
who have that profile, but a jury could reasonably conclude that 
beyond a reasonable doubt the perpetrator was the accused, who 
lives in the immediate vicinity of the crime, had the capacity to 
commit it, and engaged in behavior suggesting that he was 
preparing for it. 
 
Now, with respect to this case, you may bear in mind that there 
are approximately 250 million Caucasian people in the United 
States, so even assuming that the DNA profile in question occurs 
in only one in 10 million of them, it is reasonable to suppose that 
there are 25 or so Caucasian people in the United States with that 
trait.  It is your job, members of the jury, to put the DNA evidence 
together with all the other evidence in the case and determine 
whether, taking it all into consideration, you believe beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime charged in 
this case. 
 
Obviously, I am not wed to the language of this jury instruction; maybe 
a very different presentation would be better.  But my main point is that 
whatever the optimal phrasing may be, we in the academic community 
should work with those controlling the judicial system to ensure that courts 
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advise juries in the proper treatment of evidence and that neither the parties 
nor their experts mislead the jury.  Would something like this work?  I do 
not know, but it might help—and at least we could say that the jury was not 
being led astray.  That in itself would be a useful advance. 
 
